They well understand the theoretical justification for executive stock options, which provide an antidote to the excessive risk aversion that might otherwise hobble managers whose human capital is ineluctably linked to the survival of their corporate employer. But that rationale cannot explain corporate America's actual option-granting practices. Why, for example, do we not observe considerable differences between the structure of companies' compensation packages-differences reflecting the unique risk characteristics of each firm? Why, instead, do we observe remarkable uniformity across a range of firms of different sizes and profiles? And, why, if creating proper ''incentives'' is the goal of equity-based compensation, are executives typically permitted to unwind their equity ''incentives'' early and easilyagain with little variation between radically different firms?
''Outrage constraint'' was the term Bebchuk and Fried had earlier coined to describe one potential brake on runaway executive compensation: a constraint based on fears of outraging shareholders, or perhaps the public generally. The authors review that work, but note that outrage constraint is, at best, an imprecise tool, and may well motivate directors to direct their ingenuity toward hiding the true level of their pay (by stuffing cash into post-retirement benefits, say) rather than towards improving the financial performance of their corporate employers.
It is a sceptical picture of contemporary corporate culture, and one which, they argue, recent US corporate governance reforms are not likely to ameliorate, since many key reforms reflect practices already in place at the very companies plagued by compensation excesses. Yet the book is not merely a lament. The authors tackle the issue of more closely aligning directors' incentives with those of shareholders. Their wish is to improve directors' accountability by making directors genuinely ''dependent'' upon shareholders. They would, for example, endorse the Securities and Exchange Commission's controversial proposed rule to permit shareholders in certain circumstances to place directorial nominees directly on the ''ballot''. Indeed, they consider the director nomination proposal too small a step, and argue further for corporate law rules that would end the obstacle to shareholder democracy posed by staggered boards by requiring directors to be re-elected annually en bloc.
They would favour, too, a legislated end to US managers' power to reincorporate in another US state and amend the corporate charter. Here the book joins a lengthy ''race to the bottom''/''race to the top'' academic literature spurred by Delaware's unique position in America's corporate law competitive federalism. Bebchuk and Fried are sceptical of ''race to the top'' claims (dare I dub them ''Dela-wary''?) and accordingly doubt that preserving managers' unfettered discretion to reincorporate is likely to result in anything but manager-friendly decisions. Their prescription is to increase shareholder voice by improving transparency, and rid executives of their unchallenged power positions. As for concerns critics have voiced about possible dangers of increased shareholder democracy, Bebchuk and Fried dismiss these as incoherent, irrelevant, or more than outweighed by the prospect of increased shareholder-value creation.
Impressive in scholarship, impeccable in timing, and accessible in style, this book deserves the attention of academics, policy makers and longsuffering investors.
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